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Abstract Various tests have been proposed as helps to identify intrinsic proper-
ties. This paper compares three prominent tests (we call them Perfect Duplication,
Real Change, and Lonely) and shows that they fail to pass adequate verdicts on a set
of three properties. The paper examines whether improved versions of the tests can
reduce or remove these negative outcomes. We reach the sceptical conclusion that
whereas some of the tests must be discarded as inadequate because they don’t yield
definite results, the remaining tests depend for their application on the details of
fundamental particle physics so much so that they cannot be relied upon.
Keywords Intrinsic  Extrinsic  Relational  Properties  Entanglement 
Nonseparability
Properties have often been held to fall in neat categories: they are necessary or
contingent, essential or accidental, primary or secondary, dispositional or categor-
ical, intrinsic or extrinsic, such or so. This is the broad picture. But the devil is in the
usual spot. The detail that is the topic of this paper concerns the category of intrinsic
properties, and the problem it discusses is how to distinguish properties that are
intrinsic from those that are not. Very roughly, an intrinsic property is a property
that ‘really belongs’ to the item having it. This characterization, however, isn’t
particularly helpful. Does the property of being the queen of the UK ‘really belong’
to Elisabeth II? Is being the Evening Star a property that ‘really belongs’ to the
Morning Star? That is not so clear. In the literature, therefore, a number of explicitly
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so called ‘tests’ have been proposed as helps. They are introduced in Sect. 1. If the
tests yield determinate and converging results, this evidences that they adequately
pick out intrinsic properties. As we argue in Sect. 2, however, these tests give
neither converging nor determinate results on a set of three properties. The
remainder of the paper argues that there is no way out and defends a sceptical
conclusion: the only workable tests for intrinsicness cannot be performed without
first knowing the fundamental nature of reality—knowledge that we, as a matter of
fact, don’t have.
We begin with two preliminaries. Firstly, we focus on tests for intrinsicness as
they can be found in the literature.1 Perhaps more tests can be devised, but these are
the ones that actually have been devised. The hallmark of a test is that it is a recipe,
it tells you what to do when you want to figure out something—in this case: it tells
you what to do when you want to figure out whether a property is intrinsic or not. In
this respect tests for intrinsicness differ from analyses of intrinsicness. Analyses
aren’t recipes—they don’t tell you what to do when you want to figure out whether
something is an X; analyses aim to tell you what it is for something to be an X, they
aim to specify the nature of Xs. The tests for intrinsicness that we are going to
discuss, then, aim to help us to tell intrinsic properties from non-intrinsic properties;
they are proposed as epistemic helps for inquirers, but they don’t aim to elucidate
the underlying nature of intrinsic properties. There may be interesting relations
between tests and analyses, but that is not something we propose to explore in this
paper.
At this point it will be appropriate to indicate, albeit provisionally, when a test for
intrinsicness is a successful test. As we will be thinking of this matter, a test T for
intrinsicness is a successful test provided (a) T gives definite results for many, but
perhaps not all, properties; (b) T’s results are intuitively satisfying; and (c) T’s
results aren’t in conflict with other tests that satisfy (a) and (b).
Our second preliminary is this. It has recently been argued (Figdor 2008), that a
distinction should be made between intrinsic/extrinsic on the one hand, and
intrinsically/extrinsically on the other. The first is a distinction between properties,
the second a distinction between ways in which particulars have properties. Figdor
argues that these distinctions do not overlap, so that an extrinsic property can be had
intrinsically (her example is being witty), and an intrinsic property can be had
extrinsically (her example is being square). This entails that one and the same
property can be had intrinsically by one thing, but extrinsically by another. We
describe the tests as being directed at the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. But since our
toy set of properties are illustrated in terms of specific instantiations of those
properties, our discussion also extends naturally to the intrinsically/extrinsically
distinction.
1 Apart from the three tests that we will discuss in Sect. 1, there is one further test that can be found in
the literature that has been named ‘test for intrinsicness’ but that we won’t discuss because the notion of
‘intrinsicness’ at play there is such that what intuitively seem to be ‘relational’ properties (and so the
supposed complements of intrinsic properties) on that test also qualify as ‘intrinsic’. This test is described
in Searle (1995:11–12), and stages an opposition between intrinsic and observer-relative properties.
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1 Tests for intrinsicness
A first test involves an imaginary machine that produces perfect atom-for-atom
duplicates of originals. This test is inspired by David Lewis’s remark that ‘‘if
something has an intrinsic property then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing,
whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic
properties.’’ (Lewis 1983: 112)2 Peter van Inwagen has described the test as follows:
‘‘If a property of the original is intrinsic, it will be reproduced by the machine; that
is, it will be a property of the duplicate. Or, what is the same thing, if a property is
not reproduced by the machine, it is not intrinsic but relational.’’ (van Inwagen
2009: 40–1) then, opposes intrinsic to relational properties. However, since some
properties are arguably3 both intrinsic and relational, e.g. having longer arms than
legs, and having a proper part, we prefer to say that intrinsic properties oppose
extrinsic properties (where ‘extrinsic’ just means ‘not intrinsic’). The test that Van
Inwagen writes about can therefore be put as follows:
Perfect Duplication. If property P of object O gets copied by the perfect
duplication machine, P is an intrinsic property of O; and if the perfect
duplication machine does not copy P, P is an extrinsic property of O.
Examples that have been adduced to illustrate the cogency of this test involve the
Queen of England. The colour of the Queen’s eyes will be copied by the machine—
hence colour is an intrinsic property. But only the Queen, not her replica, will be the
crowned head of the United Kingdom—hence being the crowned head of the United
Kingdom is extrinsic.
Perfect Duplication, as formulated, is not entirely satisfactory. Take for instance
the property of having the same colour as the object at the entrance of the machine.
That property, says van Inwagen, gets copied, and so, by this test, is intrinsic. But
this, he avers, is quite obviously wrong; it is relational. He therefore holds that this
test is ‘‘useful, but fallible’’, a good rule of thumb—for two reasons. First, failure is
conclusive: a property that fails the test has to be relational. Second, the relational
properties that pass the test are rather contrived (van Inwagen 2009: 34).
A second test involves the notion of a ‘real change’ as opposed to a ‘mere
Cambridge change’. This distinction is due to Geach (1969: 71–2) who introduced it
in his discussion of an account of what it takes for an object to undergo change—the
account being that an object has changed just in case it has lost (or gained) some
property. Geach has argued that this account cannot be correct. For consider, he
urges, when Socrates becomes shorter than Theaetetus simply by virtue of the
latter’s growth. Then Socrates acquires a new property, viz. the property of being
shorter than Theaetetus, and on the account under consideration this means that
Socrates changes. But, Geach muses, this change is not a real change in Socrates; it
2 For an in-depth discussion and defense of Lewis’ account of intrinsic properties, see Sider (1996). Sider
states Lewis’s analysis of ‘intrinsic’ as follows: Property P is intrinsic iff for any possible objects x and y,
if x and y are duplicates then x has P iff y has P (Sider 1996: 2). The duplication machine is intended to
help one determine whether a property satisfies this definition.
3 See Weatherson and Marshall (2013): Sect. 2.1.
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is a real change in Theaetetus. The change in Socrates is a ‘mere Cambridge
change’.4
The second test, as described by Peter van Inwagen, involves the notion of ‘real
change’ (and hence, if only implicitly, the real change/Cambridge change
distinction): ‘‘if the gain or loss of a property would be a real change in a thing,
then that property is intrinsic; otherwise it is extrinsic.’’5 So the proposed test is:
Real Change. If object O’s loss or gain of property P would constitute a real
change in O, P is intrinsic; and if O’s loss or gain of P would not constitute a
real change in O, P is extrinsic.
Examples that have been offered to illustrate the cogency of this test include mass
and spatial positions. If a thing loses the property of having a mass of 10 kilograms,
the loss would constitute a real change in the thing—hence the property is intrinsic.
But if a thing loses the property of being located fifty miles north of a burning barn,
the loss would not constitute a real change in the thing—hence it is extrinsic. In this
latter case, the loss constitutes a ‘mere Cambridge change’, i.e. a change that isn’t
really a change of the object.
A third test, suggested by David Lewis in his discussion of a suggestion by
Jaegwon Kim, who was in turn discussing a suggestion by Roderick Chisholm
(Lewis 1983: 111–2), is that property P is intrinsic to object O provided O would
continue to have P, even if no other thing besides O were to exist; and it is extrinsic
provided O would lose P if no other thing besides O were to exist. This suggestion
contains the seeds of a test, to be performed by a thought experiment, viz. to
imaginatively remove all contingent objects other than O from the actual world, and
then see what happens to that object’s properties:
Lonely. If an object O in the actual world has property P and all contingent
objects other than O are imaginatively removed from the world (i.e. ‘‘is made
lonely’’), then if O retains P, then P is intrinsic, and if O loses P, then P is
extrinsic.6
Consider the property of being in the vicinity of Trafalgar Square. If you have that
property but are imaginatively made lonely, you lose it. Hence that property is
extrinsic. But when you are imaginatively made lonely, you remain single headed.
Hence, by Lonely, being single headed is an intrinsic property of yours.
These are the tests that we shall be considering. After showing that they are
inadequate, we will consider certain possible fixes, and we will argue that no such
fixes are plausible.
4 For a discussion of so-called Cambridge properties, see Francescotti (1999).
5 van Inwagen (2009): 40–1. A related version of this test is offered by Stump and Kretzman who aver
that ‘‘change in x’s extrinsic properties can occur without a change in x, while a change in x’s intrinsic
properties is as such a change in x’’ (Stump and Kretzman 1985).
6 This test is in fact closer to Vallentyne’s thoughts on intrinsicness than to Lewis’s. See (Vallentyne
1997; Marshall 2013).
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2 Tests for intrinsicness compared
Do these tests yield the same results? Do they yield determinate results? This
section answers both questions in the negative by applying the tests to the following
toy set of properties:
[a] being a one-euro coin
[b] being in Amsterdam
[c] wearing a golden ring
2.1 Tests applied to [a]: being a one-euro coin
Some pieces of metal have the property of being a one-euro coin (= [a]). A perfect
duplicate of such a piece of metal will be indistinguishable from the original. Still,
the duplicate may not be a real one-euro coin, for in order to qualify as such it must
be issued by a legal authority, which it may not. And if it isn’t, it’s a forgery and not
really a one-euro coin. Whether the duplicate has [a], then, depends on who operates
the machine. By Perfect Duplication [a] is intrinsic if the machine is legally
operated. But if the machine is not legally operated, the duplicate is not really a one-
euro coin, hence it doesn’t have [a], which means that [a] is not copied, which
means that [a] is extrinsic.
If a piece of metal loses [a] because it is melted, then the change is a real change
of the piece of metal—a change that entails the loss of [a]. By Real Change, then,
[a] is intrinsic to the piece of metal. But if that piece of metal loses [a] because a
new law has been issued ruling that one-euro coins are no longer legal tender, then
the piece of metal does not undergo a real change, only a change that can be
compared with Socrates when he becomes shorter than Theaetetus due to the latter’s
growth. Hence by Real Change [a] is extrinsic.
Applying Lonely, it is reasonable to suppose that since there are no mints in the
lonely world, there is no money, hence the piece of metal is not money; hence [a] is
extrinsic.
2.2 Tests applied to [b]: being in Amsterdam
Suppose a particular molecule is in Amsterdam, and the duplication machine is also
in Amsterdam. Then both the original molecule and its duplicate will have [b]: the
property of being in Amsterdam. Hence by Perfect Duplication [b] is intrinsic. But if
we suppose that the entrance of the machine is in Amsterdam, but not its exit, then
the original will have [b] but the duplicate won’t—in which case Perfect
Duplication entails that [b] is extrinsic. Hence, whether or not [b] is intrinsic
depends on the location of the entrance and exit of the machine.
2.2.1 Regarding real change
If the molecule loses [b] because Earth rotates relative to the molecule, then the
molecule does not undergo a real change, only a change that can be compared with
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Socrates when he becomes shorter than Theaetetus due to the latter’s growth. Hence
by Real Change [b] is extrinsic. However, if the molecule loses [b] because the size
of its atomic constituents, together with their relative distance, are increased so
much so that the molecule can no longer be said to be in Amsterdam, then the
molecule does undergo a real change. By Real Change, then, [b] is intrinsic to the
molecule.
Would the molecule, made lonely, still be in Amsterdam? No it would not, there
being no Amsterdam in that lonely world. Hence, by Lonely, [b] is extrinsic.
2.3 Tests applied to [c]: wearing a golden ring
If the Queen wears a golden ring, and is fed into the duplication machine, will her
duplicate wear a ring too? This depends on whether we feed the ring, along with the
Queen, into the duplication machine. If we feed Queen-with-ring to the machine, the
duplicate will wear a ring too, which means that [c] comes out as intrinsic. But if we
feed Queen-minus-ring to the machine, the duplicate won’t have [c], which means
[c] is not intrinsic. So, Perfect Duplication doesn’t give a definite answer with
respect to [c] until this test allows us to determine, without appeal to ‘intrinsic’,
whether the Queen should retain her ring or not when entering the machine. But it is
unclear how, or whether, the test can allow so much. This is a crucial point that we
shall return to in detail.
If the Queen unknowingly loses her ring down the drain while showering, there
appears to be no real change in the Queen, or at least no more of a change than her
unknowingly losing a strand of hair. But if the Queen loses her ring due to an
unfortunate accident while chopping vegetables in the kitchen, it would appear we
have a real change in the Queen, at least insofar as losing one’s finger constitutes a
real change to a person. Once again, Real Change gives conflicting results.
Lonely suffers a similar problem to Perfect Duplication: when we put the Queen
into the lonely world do we just take her as she is (jewellery and all), or must we
‘prepare’ her in a way that involves removing the ring? The former yields intrinsic
with respect to [c], while the latter yields extrinsic. The test as formulated so far
does not have the resources to yield a determinate answer.
The following table summarizes the discussion of this section:






Depends on the change















fed to the machine






2940 K. J. McQueen, R. van Woudenberg
123
The discussion so far enables us to make three embarrassing observations:
1. Typically both of the alternative and allegedly mutually exclusive verdicts can
be reached (Perfect Duplication on [a], [b] and [c]; Real Change on [a], [b] and
[c], Lonely on [c]).
2. No one test gives the same series of verdicts on [a]-[e] as any of the other tests.
3. None of the properties are tested by all the tests as intrinsic, and none are tested
by all the tests as non-intrinsic.
Can we reduce the embarrassment? Let us begin by reconsidering Real Change.
3 Farewell real change
The formulations of our three tests all had something in common: they require us to
test whether a given object retains a property (or undergoes a real change) in a given
world. This, however, means that the features of those worlds may impact the
results of the tests in undesired ways. To forestall such undesired influences we can,
perhaps, improve the tests by making them more general. In the case of Real
Change it seems we just need to ensure that a real change is guaranteed by the loss
or gain of an intrinsic property:
Real Change*. In all possible worlds in which object O loses or gains property
P, if O’s loss or gain of property P constitutes a real change in O, P is intrinsic;
otherwise P is extrinsic.
This increase in modal strength leads to sensible determinate results for our test
cases. And it is easy to see why: finding just one world in which O does not undergo
a real change despite losing P (e.g. a world in which the Queen loses her ring in the
shower) is sufficient to guarantee a determinate test result: extrinsic. Note that
Perfect Duplication admits a similar fix:
Perfect Duplication*. In all possible worlds in which object O has property P
and O is fed into a duplication machine, if P is retained by O’s duplicate, P is
an intrinsic property of O; otherwise P is extrinsic.
Consider [b], the property of being in Amsterdam. Whether that property comes out
as intrinsic or not, we suggested, depends on where the machine outputs O’s
duplicate. But only in some possible worlds will the machine output O’s duplicate in
Amsterdam. In other worlds, it will output O’s duplicate in New Zealand. Since
there are worlds in which O’s duplicate fails to possess [b], [b] is extrinsic—in line
with our intuitions. Clearly, a similar point can be made about [a]. However, as we
shall see, [c] is going to point to deeper difficulties. We will return to this, once we
have said farewell to Real Change*.
Let us recall the piece of metal which has [a], the property of being a one-euro
coin. We asked whether that piece of metal’s loss of [a] would constitute a real
change in it. What our discussion brought out was this: if the piece of metal loses
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[a] due to melting, then the metal loses [a] because of a real change; after all, the
melting of a piece of metal is a real change of it, and hence [a] is intrinsic to the
metal. But if the piece of metal loses [a] due to a change of the law, then the piece of
metal undergoes a mere Cambridge change which means that [a] comes out as
extrinsic.
However, we see nothing special about our examples and suspect that for most
properties it will be possible to generate analogous contradictory results, provided
that one is imaginative enough. This is a problem because it means that Real
Change* will typically yield the result extrinsic in cases where the intuitive result is
intrinsic.
To convince ourselves of this, let us consider one more example property, which
is intuitively intrinsic. In particular, let’s consider the property we removed from the
coin, which generated both a loss of [a] and a real change: the property of being
solid. Surely, any way of removing the solidity of the coin will yield a real change in
the coin. In that case, Real Change gives a determinate and intuitively satisfying
result: solidity is intrinsic.
With a little imagination, however, we can remove the coin’s solidity, but yield
the intuition that the coin has not undergone a real change. Let’s first get clear on the
concept of solidity. A solid is often defined as a rigid material which does not flow
when it is subjected to moderate forces (Doremus 1994: 339). Here ‘moderate’ is
the important notion. Take a Maxwell body, such as glass. Glass flows like a fluid
for small forces over long timescales (e.g. gravitational effect on window panes), is
solid for small forces over short timescales (e.g. knuckle tap), and is brittle for large
forces over short timescales (e.g. throwing bottles). Now consider a continental
plate, which is solid when we walk on it (small force, small timescale), elastic in
response to an Earthquake (large force, medium timescale), brittle in response to an
asteroid (large force, small timescale), but fluid on the timescale of the age of Earth.
With this in mind, let’s remove the solidity of the coin without really changing
the coin, i.e., by only changing properties of objects that are wholly distinct from the
coin. We simply change them in such a way so that what counts as ‘moderate
forces’ changes: the dynamics of other objects relative to the coin are slowed right
down so that from the perspective of the coin, only small forces are applied to the
coin over large time-scales. But from the perspective of all other objects, these
forces and time-scales are now considered the norm. For example, after holding the
coin in your hand only over what you would (in this hypothetical scenario) consider
a moderate time-scale, the coin, in response to gravity (moderate force), will ooze
out across your palm into a puddle. No real change in the coin (at least prior to these
gravitational effects), only a change that can be compared with Socrates when he
becomes shorter than Theaetetus due to the latter’s growth. But we have a loss of
solidity, so by Real Change*, solidity is extrinsic. So for any putative intrinsic
property of an object, just think of a possible world (however outlandish) in which
the property is lost (or gained) simply by changing the states of other objects. In
doing so Real Change* will always yield extrinsic.
The mistake made by Real Change (and Real Change*), we diagnose, is that it
gets things the wrong way around. It seems that what it is for an object to undergo a
real change (if this is meaningful notion at all) is for the object to lose an intrinsic
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property. And so to test for a real change we need to look for a change in intrinsic
properties. But for this we need an independent test for intrinsicness.
4 Perfect Duplication* and Lonely salvaged?
Our progress on embarrassment reduction can be represented in the following (now
depleted) table:
Perfect Duplication* Lonely








Depends on what’s fed into the
machine
Depends on what’s made
lonely
What about property [c], wearing a golden ring? Recall that Perfect Duplication
failed to yield a result since it left open whether we should remove the ring before
duplicating the Queen. This problem is not solved by Perfect Duplication* since this
problem concerns what we feed into the machine, not where we locate the machine.
And recall that Lonely applied to [c] failed to yield a result for the same reason.
Perhaps the solution (for both Perfect Duplication* on [c] and Lonely on [c]) is
simply to get clear on the referent of ‘Queen’: what are the objects that compose the
Queen? Thus, we first make a judgment about composition, and then we apply the
tests.
Naturally, we would not take the ring to be a component part of the Queen, and
so we would remove the ring before the duplicator or the lonely world even come
into play. If this is a legitimate response then we are finally having some success; for
both tests now (apparently) give determinate and intuitively correct results.
Should we conclude that Perfect Duplication* and Lonely are adequate tests for
intrinsicality? We think not. The relevant thought experiments now require that we
isolate the ultimate component parts of the Queen. For Perfect Duplication*, we
must isolate the relevant constituents so that we know what to put into the
duplicator. For Lonely, we must isolate the relevant constituents so that we know
what objects are to be made lonely. The problem is that unless we first understand
the atomic constituents of the Queen, we have no clue as to what properties the
Queen will retain if made lonely, or what properties the Queen’s duplicate will
retain. The final section is dedicated to pressing this problem.
5 Farewell Lonely and Perfect Duplication*
Our remaining tests, as we will now argue, are infected by a problem analogous to
Hempel’s famous dilemma for materialism (Hempel 1969). Materialism (roughly)
states that everything is (or is made of, or is grounded in) matter. Materialism’s
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dilemma is that ‘matter’ is either defined by present physics or by ideal future
physics. If the former, materialism is (most likely) false since our present theories of
matter are (most likely) false. If the latter then we don’t know what materialism says
because we don’t know what ideal future physics says. This dilemma is relevant for
Lonely and Perfect Duplication*. For when performing the relevant thought
experiments we need to isolate the atomic constituents of the objects we are testing
for the presence of intrinsic properties, before sending those objects (or their
duplicates) into other possible worlds. The first step—isolating the atomic
constituents—will require some understanding of those constituents. We either
use our current limited understanding of the atomic constituents, or we use non-
existent (ideal completed) physics. Either way, we have no reliable way of
executing the tests for a given case, as we will now argue.
The second horn of the dilemma is clearly problematic. Our tests are intended to
offer ways of determining whether a given property is intrinsic or not. However, if
the tests require a physical theory we do not have (ideal future physics) then we
simply cannot perform the tests.
The first horn of the dilemma states that if the tests require current physics, then
we cannot trust our tests due to the fallibility of the physical theories. To illustrate
the fallibility of physics compare the following two theories, one that resembles
classical physics, and one that resembles modern physics. We now show that even
for the most mundane properties, test results are radically different depending on the
physical theory one adopts. Here are the two theories:
Theory 1: Billiardballism: the atomic constituents of the Queen (and every
other object) are tiny billiard balls, that differ from normal billiard balls only
in scale—both ultimately obey the laws of Newtonian physics.
Theory 2: Global Nonseparability: the atomic constituents of the Queen (and
every other object) are described by textbook quantum mechanics and the
physical states (including the positions) of any given atom in the universe are
nonseparable from the physical states of all other atoms in the universe.7
Billiardballism is self-explanatory. Let’s begin by considering how Lonely
categorizes the Queen’s shape, and the Queen’s wearing a golden ring, given
Billiardballism. We take all the atoms that compose the Queen, and remove every
other atom, to see whether the Queen retains her shape and her ring. In the lonely
universe the atomic billiard balls retain their configuration. Since the Queen’s shape
presumably supervenes on the configuration of her atomic parts, the Queen
presumably retains her shape. Her shape is therefore intrinsic.8 Since we do not
7 We define textbook quantum mechanics as a realist theory that describes physical systems in terms of
Hilbert space formalism. Nonseparability is defined by Esfeld (2004) as follows: ‘‘The states of two or
more systems are nonseparable iff it is only the joint state of the whole that completely determines the
state-dependent properties of each system and the correlations among these systems (to the extent that
these are determined at all)’’.
8 One might worry that the sudden loss of surrounding objects will gravitationally affect the shape of the
Queen, but the point of the thought experiment, we take it, is to consider the Queen at the first moment of
loneliness, before the effects of having no surroundings come into play.
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deem the atomic parts of the Queen’s ring to be parts of the Queen, the ring’s parts
are removed, so the Queen does not retain the ring. Her wearing a golden ring is
therefore extrinsic.
Perfect Duplication*, given Billiardballism, will effectively give the same
results: since the configuration of the Queen’s parts are duplicated, her shape is
duplicated (necessarily), so her shape is intrinsic; since the ring’s parts are not
duplicated, her ring is not duplicated (necessarily), so her wearing the ring is
extrinsic.
Before we consider how Global Nonseparability affects our tests, a gentle
introduction to the idea of nonseparability will be useful. To simplify, consider an
atom that is a part of the Queen (particle 1) and another that is not part of the Queen
(particle 2). In quantum mechanics, particle states (e.g. particle positions) are
designated by vectors. So if particle 1 is located at Xa (i.e. point a on the X axis)
then we represent its position with the term |Xa[ 1, where ‘|[’ indicates a vector.
However, particles are not typically in definite positions (the same goes for other
physical properties like momentum and spin). Instead, particles are in so-called
superpositions of different positions. Metaphysically, superpositions are notoriously
difficult. But mathematically they are well understood, and can be represented by
weighted sums of vectors. For example, particle 1’s being in a superposition of Xa
and Xc is represented as #|Xa[ 1 ? #|Xc[ 1.
9 Crucially, if particle 1 has (in
almost any way) interacted with particle 2, then their positions will be non-
separable such that their joint position-state will be represented by something like:
# Xa[ 1j jXb[ 2ð Þ þ# Xc[ 1j jXd[ 2ð Þ
According to this quantum state, particle 1 is not (strictly speaking) in a
superposition of being located at Xa and being located at Xc: it is in a nonseparable
superposition with particle 2. This entails that particle 1 has no position of its own:
the nonseparable state is (as the name suggests) not decomposable into individual
component position states. Global nonseparability is the thesis that no particle has a
position of its own: every particle is in a nonseparable superposition with every
other particle.
Now consider what happens when we try to make the Queen’s constituents
lonely, given Global Nonseparability. Since the positions of 1 and 2 are
nonseparable, if we remove particle 2 we inevitably remove particle 1. The idea
is that removing particle 2 entails that particle 2 no longer has a position. But
removing 2’s position inevitably removes particle 1’s position, thereby removing
particle 1 itself. Given global nonseparability, particle 2’s position is nonseparable
with all the particles that compose the Queen. So removing particle 2 removes the
9 |Xa[ and |Xc[will be orthogonal unit-length vectors in a high-dimensional vector space. For an easy
introduction to this formalism see Albert (1992: Chapter 2). Mathematically, our example involves a
superposition of delta functions (eigenfunctions of the position operator). Such functions are problematic
in quantum mechanics and are used here just for simplicity. Our argument could equally well be
expressed in terms of superpositions of Gaussian functions.
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Queen.10 Similarly for the Queen’s property of wearing a golden ring: since the
positions of the ring’s constituents and the positions of the Queen’s constituents are
nonseparable, removing the ring (i.e. literally removing it from the world in the
process of making the Queen lonely) removes the Queen. This would appear to
destroy the test entirely: given Global Nonseparability, it is simply not possible to
make the Queen lonely.
Assuming Global Nonseparabilty, is there any way to recast Lonely in such a
way that it can yield determinate results? We’ve been working with a conception of
Lonely under which one removes all particles except for those that constitute the
property bearer of interest. But we could try to make the property bearer lonely in
another way, viz. by transporting it to an empty possible world. But even that
wouldn’t help: how could particle 1 be transported to another world by itself, given
its nonseparability with particle 2? Perhaps, however, we can fix Lonely with an
additional ad hoc stipulation: if particles to be made lonely happen to be
nonseparable from particles that are not to be made lonely, then ‘‘separate’’ them
first. However, since separating nonseparable particles requires changing their
physical states entirely, the question arises: what states do we change them to before
making them lonely? The states that guarantee that Lonely yields intuitive results?
But this would make Lonely circular. Furthermore, even if we fixed on some way of
separating nonseparable particles, we have no reliable way of knowing what effect
that will have on a complex object like the Queen, so we would not know what
properties she would retain, so Lonely still gives no results.
Finally, one might think that if it really is the case that removing particle 2
removes the Queen, then this is evidence that particle 2 is actually a part of the
Queen after all. But then given global nonseparability, the Queen is composed of
every particle in the universe. Removing every particle that does not compose the
Queen then means removing nothing. Alternatively, transporting the Queen to an
empty world means duplicating the actual world. Consequently, every property of
the Queen would turn out to be intrinsic. This is the bullet that we think defenders of
Lonely must ultimately bite. Before explaining the problem with this consequence,
we will show that the same problem arises for Perfect Duplication*.
As with Lonely there are two ways we can understand the duplication test: either
the duplication machine puts the duplicate in the actual world (Perfect Duplication)
or it puts the duplicate in any possible world (Perfect Duplication*). Either way, the
problem is that we cannot literally isolate the Queen’s parts to put them (and only
them) in the machine, given their nonseparability with all other particles.
Duplicating the Queen in the actual world (in accordance with Perfect Duplication)
requires that the Queen-duplicate is constructed so that her parts are nonseparable
from every other particle in the universe in the same way as the Queen-original. We
cannot see any way of making sense of this situation. Alternatively, if the machine
puts the Queen in an alternative possible world, then to be a duplicate her
nonseparable state must remain, and so the machine does not duplicate only the
10 Strictly speaking what’s removed is the Queen’s property of having a position (any position). One
might maintain that something is nonetheless made lonely: a position less bare particular—but such an
entity would not be the Queen and would not retain any interesting properties.
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Queen, but duplicates the entire actual world in the alternative possible world. Here
we at least get meaningful results, but ones which deem all of the Queen’s
properties intrinsic. This is the bullet that we think defenders of Perfect
Duplication* must ultimately bite.
We now have our illustration of (horn one of) our Hempel-like dilemma: Lonely
and Perfect Duplication* give radically different results depending on whether we
appeal to a theory resembling classical physics (Billiardballism) or a theory
resembling modern physics (Global Nonseparability). For example, on the former
theory, only a small portion of the Queen’s properties are intrinsic, while on the
latter, all of them are.
Now, a defender of these tests might simply bite these bullets and respond that
although the tests do not give us the information we were hoping for, they still give
us some information—enough to render them acceptable tests for intrinsicality. In
particular, although the tests do not yield information of the form:
properties X, Y, and Z, are intrinsic;
properties U, V, and W are non-intrinsic;
they at least yield information of the form:
if GNS then properties X, Y, and Z, are intrinsic;
if Billiardballism then properties X, Y, and Z are non-intrinsic.
However, we do not think these conditionals are enough to render them
acceptable tests. To explain why we use an analogy. Suppose a physician knows
the following two conditionals:
if my patient S suffers from disease D, then cure C will cure S;
if S suffers from disease D*, then C will kill S;
but the medical tests available to him don’t enable him to conclude whether S
suffers from D or D*. Then these conditionals, true as they may be, are not
epistemic helps for deciding whether or not to apply cure C. Analogously, the
intrinsicality conditionals, true as they may be, are not epistemic helps for deciding
whether or not to apply the predicate ‘is intrinsic’.
Is there any way other to salvage our tests? One common reaction we have faced
by defenders of intrinsicness consists in the following suspicion: our argument
somehow depends on the assumption that worlds containing lonely individuals (or
worlds that host the duplicates) are governed by the same laws of nature as the
actual world. The upshot is then meant to be that the interpretation of quantum
mechanics is irrelevant to what happens in such worlds.11 However, this reaction is
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of quantum nonseparabilty.
The reaction appears to suppose that by placing the Queen in a world with
different laws (or no laws at all), the nonseparabilty of the Queen’s components
somehow vanishes. But this is wrong. Imagine that we aim to make the Queen
11 Note that Vallentyne (1997, 212), in his discussion of Lonely, requires that laws of nature are to be
removed from the relevant world, as well as all contingent objects other than the one possessing the
putative intrinsic property.
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lonely. Will removing the laws of quantum mechanics remove the nonseparabilty of
the Queen’s components? No it will not. The reason is that nonseparabilty refers not
to features of the laws of quantum mechanics, but to physical states that are brought
on by the laws of quantum mechanics. If you remove the laws of nature you do not
thereby remove the physical states that those laws previously gave rise to. This
reaction therefore appears to treat nonseparability as a feature of physical laws when
in reality it is a feature of physical states.
Perhaps what the defender of intrinsicality wants is this: when the Queen is
duplicated to a possible world with different (or no) laws, or when she is made
lonely (in a way that removes quantum laws) then any physical states that can only
be brought on by actual-world-laws must be removed. But this is no help either:
how do we go about removing the relevant physical states of the Queen (or her
duplicate)? As mentioned above, doing so will inevitably change the Queen. But
there is no fact of the matter as to how this will change her! The defender of
intrinsicality may want to change the Queen so that she is gauranteed to retain only
those properties that are intuitively intrinsic. But then the test itself becomes
superfluous, and we are left with no reliable way of testing for intrinsicness.
Are there any other ways out for the defender of intrinsicality? Perhaps one could
reject Global Nonseparability in some way. Let’s consider two responses along
these lines. The first denies modern quantum mechanics in general, the second
denies Global Nonseparability more specifically.
One might respond with skepticism about modern physics, and therefore
skepticism about any theory that resembles it, such as Global Nonseparabilty.
Indeed, a response in this spirit was advocated by David Lewis when he realized
that an aspect of his metaphysics made the same problematic assumption that is
apparently made by Lonely and Perfect Duplication. The assumption often comes
under the label locality. To the nonlocality12 inherent in quantum mechanics Lewis
famously replied:
I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from quantum physics as it is now.
First I must see how it looks when it is purified of instrumentalist frivolity, and
dares to say something not just about pointer readings but about the
constitution of the world; and when it is purified of double thinking deviant
logic; and—most of all—when it is purified of supernatural tales about the
observant mind to make things jump. If, after all that, it still teaches
nonlocality, I shall submit willingly to the best of authority. (Lewis 1986: xi)
Could a similar defense be given on behalf of our tests? That is, could we ignore the
results from above by asserting that quantum mechanics itself is in bad shape (e.g.
due to the suspicious causal role it apparently attributes to the observant mind)? Not
likely, since modern realist materialist reconstructions of quantum mechanics still
12 Nonlocality is an implication of nonseparability. Some interactions with nonseparable particles are
nonlocal in the sense that effecting a change on particle 1 in region A can instantaneously influence how
particle 2 will react to an interaction in region B, where A and B are arbitrarily far apart (Albert 1992:
Chapter 3).
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postulate nonlocality.13 Furthermore Global Nonseparability itself is hardly an
outlandish possibility. As Schaffer (2010 Sect. 2.2) has pointed out, many physicists
suspect that the big bang made the positions of all particles nonseparable. Thus, if
anything, Global Nonseparability should be a serious candidate physical theory that
guides our tests.
This brings us to the second response: instead of denying quantum mechanics, just
deny Global Nonseparabilty, and advocate an alternative understanding of quantum
mechanics. There is some precedent for this. After all, quantum mechanics faces
difficult problems, which have given rise to a number of so-called ‘‘interpretations’’
of quantum mechanics, which are essentially different physical theories attempting
to deal with those problems. And in particular, some interpretations introduce
additional fundamental ontology over and above what is described by Global
Nonseparability (e.g. Bohm 1952). Perhaps it could be argued that such additions
(and their composites) have some intrinsic properties that our tests classify in an
intuitively satisfying way. However, this simply brings out how sharp the first horn of
the dilemma is: there is no consensus at all as to which (if any) is the correct
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Thus, for even the most mundane properties
(such as the Queen’s wearing a golden ring), our tests only have a chance of giving
intuitive results under very specific, highly controversial, interpretations of quantum
mechanics. The fact that intuitive results may only obtain under theories resembling
classical physics suggests that intrinsicality may just be a notion that belongs to a
metaphysics that builds on a now outdated physics. At any rate, we conclude that the
tests for intrinsicness considered here cannot be relied upon.
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